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Moti Mizrahi, Florida Institute of Technology, mmizrahi@fit.edu  
 
Bernard Wills (2018) joins Christopher Brown (2017, 2018) in criticizing my defense of Weak 
Scientism (Mizrahi 2017a, 2017b, 2018a). Unfortunately, it seems that Wills did not read my 
latest defense of Weak Scientism carefully, nor does he cite any of the other papers in my 
exchange with Brown. For he attributes to me the view that “other disciplines in the humanities 
[in addition to philosophy] do not produce knowledge” (Wills 2018, 18). Of course, this is not 
my view and I affirm no such thing, contrary to what Wills seems to think. I find it hard to 
explain how Wills could have made this mistake, given that he goes on to quote me as follows: 
“Scientific knowledge can be said to be qualitatively better than non-scientific knowledge insofar 
as such knowledge is explanatorily, instrumentally, and predictively more successful than non-
scientific knowledge” (Mizrahi 2018a, 7; quoted in Wills 2018, 18). Clearly, the claim 
‘Scientific knowledge is better than non-scientific knowledge’ entails that there is non-scientific 
knowledge. If the view I defend entails that there is non-scientific knowledge, then it cannot also 
be my view that “science produces knowledge and all the other things we tend to call knowledge 
are in fact not knowledge at all but something else” (Wills 2018, 18). 
 
Even if he somehow missed this simple logical point, reading the other papers in my 
exchange with Brown should have made it clear to Wills that I do not deny the production of 
knowledge by non-scientific disciplines. In fact, I explicitly state that “science produces 
scientific knowledge, mathematics produces mathematical knowledge, philosophy produces 
philosophical knowledge, and so on” (Mizrahi 2017a, 353). Even in my latest reply to Brown, 
which is the only paper from my entire exchange with Brown that Wills cites, I explicitly state 
that, if Weak Scientism is true, then “philosophical knowledge would be inferior to scientific 
knowledge both quantitatively (in terms of research output and research impact) and qualitatively 
(in terms of explanatory, instrumental, and predictive success)” (Mizrahi 2018a, 8). If 
philosophical knowledge is quantitatively and qualitatively inferior to scientific knowledge, then 
it follows that there is philosophical knowledge. For this reason, only a rather careless reader 
could attribute to me the view that “other disciplines in the humanities [in addition to 
philosophy] do not produce knowledge” (Wills 2018, 18). 
 
Right from the start, then, Wills gets Weak Scientism wrong, even though he later writes 
that, according to Weak Scientism, “there may be knowledge of some sort outside of the 
sciences” (Wills 2018, 18). He says that he will ignore the quantitative claim of Weak Scientism 
and focus “on the qualitative question and particularly on the claim that science produces 
knowledge and all the other things we tend to call knowledge are in fact not knowledge at all but 
something else” (Wills 2018, 18). Wills can focus on whatever he wants, of course, but that is 
not Weak Scientism. Weak Scientism is not the view that only science produces real knowledge; 
that is Strong Scientism (Mizrahi 2017a, 353). Rather, Weak Scientism is the view that, “Of all 
the knowledge we have [i.e., there is knowledge other than scientific knowledge], scientific 
knowledge is the best knowledge” (Mizrahi 2017a, 354). In other words, scientific knowledge “is 
simply the best; better than all the rest” (Mizrahi 2017b, 20). Wills’ criticism, then, misses the 
mark completely. That is, it cannot be a criticism against Weak Scientism, since Weak Scientism 
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is not the view that “science produces knowledge and all the other things we tend to call 
knowledge are in fact not knowledge at all but something else” (Wills 2018, 18). 
 
Although he deems the quantitative superiority of scientific knowledge over non-
scientific knowledge “a tangential point,” and says that he will not spend time on it, Wills (2018, 
18) remarks that “A German professor once told [him] that in the first half of the 20th Century 
there were 40,000 monographs on Franz Kafka alone!” Presumably, Wills’ point is that research 
output in literature exceeds that of scientific disciplines. Instead of relying on gut feelings and 
hearsay, Wills should have done the required research in order to determine whether scholarly 
output in literature really does exceed the research output of scientific disciplines. If we look at 
the Scopus database, using the data and visualization tools provided by Scimago Journal & 
Country Rank (www.scimagojr.com), we can see that research output in a natural science like 
physics and a social science like psychology far exceeds research output in humanistic 
disciplines like literature and philosophy. On average, psychology has produced 15,000 more 
publications per year than either literature or philosophy between the years 1999 and 2017. 
Likewise, on average, physics has produced 54,000 more publications per year than either 
literature or philosophy between the years 1999 and 2017 (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Research output in Literature, Philosophy, Physics, and Psychology from 1999 to 2017 
(Source: Scimago Journal & Country Rank) 
 
 
 
Contrary to what Wills seems to think or what his unnamed German professor may have told 
him, then, it is not the case that literary scholars produce more work on Shakespeare or Kafka 
alone than physicists or psychologists produce. The data from the Scopus database show that, on 
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average, it takes literature and philosophy almost two decades to produce what psychology 
produces in two years or what physics produces in a single year (Mizrahi 2017a, 357-359). 
 
In fact, using JSTOR Data for Research (www.jstor.org/dfr), we can check Wills’ 
number, as reported to him by an unnamed German professor, to find out that there are 13,666 
publications (i.e., journal articles, books, reports, and pamphlets) on Franz Kafka from 1859 to 
2018 in the JSTOR database. Clearly, that is not even close to “40,000 monographs on Franz 
Kafka alone” in the first half of the 20th Century (Wills 2018, 18). By comparison, as of May 22, 
2018, the JSTOR database contains more publications on the Standard Model in physics and the 
theory of conditioning in behavioral psychology than on Franz Kafka or William Shakespeare 
(Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Search results for ‘Standard Model’, ‘Conditioning’, ‘William Shakespeare’, and ‘Franz 
Kafka’ in the JSTOR database as a percentage of the total number of publications, n = 
12,633,298 (Source: JSTOR Data for Research) 
 
 Number of Publications Percentage of JSTOR corpus 
Standard Model 971,968 7.69% 
Conditioning 121,219 0.95% 
William Shakespeare 93,700 0.74% 
Franz Kafka 13,667 0.1% 
 
Similar results can be obtained from Google Books Ngram Viewer when we compare 
published work on Shakespeare, which Wills thinks exceeds all published work in other 
disciplines, for he says that “Shakespeare scholars have all of us beat” (Wills 2018, 18), with 
published work on a contemporary of Shakespeare (1564-1616) from another field of study, 
namely, Galileo (1564-1642). As we can see from Figure 2, from 1700 to 2000, ‘Galileo’ 
consistently appears in more books than ‘William Shakespeare’ does. 
 
Figure 2. Google Books results for ‘William Shakespeare’ and ‘Galileo’ from 1700 to 2000 
(Source: Google Books Ngram Viewer) 
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Wills continues to argue fallaciously when he resorts to what appears to be a fallacious 
ad hominem attack against me. He asks (rhetorically?), “Is Mr. Mizrahi producing an argument 
or a mere rationalization of his privilege?” (Wills 2018, 19) It is not clear to me what sort of 
“privilege” Wills wants to claim that I have, or why he accuses me of colonialism and sexism, 
since he provides no arguments for these outrageous charges. Moreover, I do not see how this is 
at all relevant to Weak Scientism. Even if I am somehow “privileged” (whatever Wills means by 
that), Weak Scientism is either true or false regardless. After all, I take it that Wills would not 
doubt his physician’s diagnoses just because he or she is “privileged” for working at a hospital. 
Whether his physician is “privileged” for working at a hospital has nothing to do with the 
accuracy of his or her diagnoses. For these reasons, Wills’ ad hominem is fallacious (as opposed 
to a legitimate ad hominem as a rebuttal to an argument from authority, see Mizrahi 2010). I 
think that SERRC readers will be better served if we focus on the ideas under discussion, 
specifically, Weak Scientism, not the people who discuss them. 
 
Speaking of privilege and sexism, however, it might be worth noting that, throughout his 
paper, Wills refers to me as ‘Mr. Mizrahi’ (rather than ‘Dr. Mizrahi’ or simply ‘Mizrahi’, as is 
the norm in academic publications), and that he has misspelled my name on more than one 
occasion (Wills 2018, 18, 22, 24). Studies suggest that addressing female doctors with ‘Ms.’ or 
‘Mrs.’ rather than ‘Dr.’ might reveal gender bias (see, e.g., Files et al. 2017). Perhaps forms of 
address reveal not only gender bias but also ethnic or racial bias when people with non-white or 
“foreign” names are addressed as Mr. (or Ms.) rather than Dr. (Erlenbusch 2018). 
 
Aside from unsubstantiated claims about the amount of research produced by literary 
scholars, fallacious appeals to the alleged authority of unnamed German professors, and 
fallacious ad hominem attacks, does Wills offer any good arguments against Weak Scientism? He 
spends most of his paper (pages 19-22) trying to show that there is knowledge other than 
scientific knowledge, such as knowledge produced in the fields of “Law and Music Theory” 
(Wills 2018, 20). This, however, does nothing at all to undermine Weak Scientism. For, as 
mentioned above, Weak Scientism is the view that scientific knowledge is superior to non-
scientific knowledge, which means that there is non-scientific knowledge; it’s just not as good as 
scientific knowledge (Mizrahi 2017a, 356). 
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Wills finally gets to Weak Scientism on the penultimate page of his paper. His main 
objection against Weak Scientism seems to be that it is not clear to him how scientific knowledge 
is supposed to be better than non-scientific knowledge. For instance, he asks, “Better in what 
context? By what standard of value?” (Wills 2018, 23) Earlier he also says that he is not sure 
what are the “certain relevant respect” in which scientific knowledge is superior to non-scientific 
knowledge (Wills 2018, 18). Unfortunately, this shows that Wills either has not read the other 
papers in my exchange with Brown or at least has not read them carefully. For, starting with my 
first defense of Weak Scientism (2017a), I explain in great detail the ways in which scientific 
knowledge is better than non-scientific knowledge. Briefly, scientific knowledge is quantitatively 
better than non-scientific knowledge in terms of research output (i.e., more publications) and 
research impact (i.e., more citations). Scientific knowledge is qualitatively better than non-
scientific knowledge in terms of explanatory, instrumental, and predictive success (Mizrahi 
2017a, 364; Mizrahi 2017b, 11). 
 
Wills tries to challenge the claim that scientific knowledge is quantitatively better than 
non-scientific knowledge by exclaiming, “Does science produce more knowledge that [sic] 
anything else? Hardly” (Wills 2018, 23). He appeals to Augustine’s idea that one “can produce a 
potential infinity of knowledge simply by reflecting recursively on the fact of [one’s] own 
existence” (Wills 2018, 23). In response, I would like to borrow a phrase from Brown (2018, 30): 
“good luck getting that published!” Seriously, though, the point is that Weak Scientism is a thesis 
about academic knowledge or research. In terms of research output, scientific disciplines 
outperform non-scientific disciplines (see Figure 1 and Table 1 above; Mizrahi 2017a, 357-359; 
Mizrahi 2018a, 20-21). Besides, just as “recursive processes can extend our knowledge 
indefinitely in the field of mathematics,” they can also extend our knowledge in other fields as 
well, including scientific fields. That is, one “can produce a potential infinity of knowledge 
simply by reflecting recursively on the” (Wills 2018, 23) Standard Model in physics or any other 
scientific theory and/or finding. For this reason, Wills’ objection does nothing at all to undermine 
Weak Scientism. 
 
Wills (2018, 23) tries to problematize the notions of explanatory, instrumental, and 
predictive success in an attempt to undermine the claim that scientific knowledge is qualitatively 
better than non-scientific knowledge in terms of explanatory, instrumental, and predictive 
success. But it seems that he misunderstands these notions as they apply to the scientism debate. 
As far as instrumental success is concerned, Wills (2018, 23) asks, “Does science have (taken in 
bulk) more instrumental success than other knowledge forms? How would you even count given 
that craft knowledge has roughly 3 million-year head start?” Even if it is true that “craft 
knowledge has roughly 3 million-year head start,” it is irrelevant to whether Weak Scientism is 
true or false. This is because Weak Scientism is a thesis about academic knowledge or research 
produced by academic fields of study (Mizrahi 2017a, 356; Mizrahi 2017b, 11; Mizrahi 2018a, 
12). 
 
As far as explanatory success is concerned, Wills (2018, 23) writes, “Is science more 
successful at explanation? Hardly, if science could solve problems in literature or history then 
these fields would not even exist.” There are a couple of problems with this objection. First, 
explaining and problem solving are not the same thing (Mizrahi and Buckwalter 2014). Second, 
what makes scientific explanations good explanations are the good-making properties that are 
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supposed to make all explanations (both scientific and non-scientific) good explanations, 
namely, unification, coherence, simplicity, and testability (Mizrahi 2017a, 360-362; Mizrahi 
2017b, 19-20; Mizrahi 2018a, 17). I have already made this point several times in my replies to 
Brown, which Wills does not cite, namely, that Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is used 
in both scientific and non-scientific contexts (Mizrahi 2017a, 362). That is, “IBE is everywhere” 
(Mizrahi 2017b, 20). It’s just that scientific IBEs are better than non-scientific IBEs because they 
exhibit more of (and to a greater extent) the aforementioned properties that make any explanation 
a good explanation (Mizrahi 2018b). 
 
As far as predictive success is concerned, Wills (2018, 23) asks, “Does science make 
more true predictions? Again how would you even count given that for millions of years, human 
beings survived by making hundreds of true predictions daily?” There are a few problems with 
this objection as well. First, even if it is true that “for millions of years, human beings survived 
by making hundreds of true predictions daily,” it is irrelevant to whether Weak Scientism is true 
or false, since Weak Scientism is a thesis about academic knowledge or research produced by 
academic fields of study (Mizrahi 2017a, 356; Mizrahi 2017b, 11; Mizrahi 2018a, 12). 
 
Second, contrary to what Wills (2018, 24) seems to think, testing predictions in science is 
not simply a matter of making assertions and then checking to see if they are true. For one thing, 
a prediction is not simply an assertion, but rather a consequence that follows from a hypothesis 
plus auxiliary hypotheses (Mizrahi 2015). For another, a prediction needs to be novel such that 
we would not expect it to be the case except from the vantage point of the theory that we are 
testing (Mizrahi 2012). As I have advised Brown (Mizrahi 2018, 17), I would also advise Wills 
to consult logic and reasoning textbooks, not because they provide support for the claim that 
“science is instrumentally successful, explanatory and makes true predictions,” as Wills (2018, 
23) erroneously thinks, but because they discuss hypothesis testing in science. For Wills’ (2018, 
24) remark about Joyce scholars suggests a failure to understand how hypotheses are tested in 
science. 
 
Third, like Brown (2017, 49), Wills (2018, 23) admits that, just like science, philosophy 
is in the explanation business. For Wills (2018, 23) says that, “certainty, instrumental success, 
utilitarian value, predictive power and explanation all exist elsewhere in ways that are often not 
directly commensurable with the way they exist in science” (emphasis added). But if distinct 
fields of study have the same aim (i.e., to explain), then their products (i.e., explanations) can be 
evaluated with respect to similar criteria, such as unification, coherence, simplicity, and 
testability (Mizrahi 2017a, 360-362; Mizrahi 2017b, 19-20; Mizrahi 2018a, 17). In other words, 
there is no incommensurability here, as Wills seems to think, insofar as both science and 
philosophy produce explanations and those explanations must exhibit the same good-making 
properties that make all explanations good explanations (Mizrahi 2018a, 17; 2018b). 
 
If Wills (2018, 24) wants to suggest that philosophers should be “testing their assertions 
in the ways peculiar to their disciplines,” then I would agree. However, “testing” does not simply 
mean making assertions and then checking to see if they are true, as Wills seems to think. After 
all, how would one check to see if assertions about theoretical entities are true? To test a 
hypothesis properly, one must derive a consequence from it (plus auxiliary assumptions) that 
would be observed only if the hypothesis (plus the auxiliary assumptions) is true. Observations 
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and/or experimentation would then indicate to one whether the consequence obtains or not 
(Mizrahi 2012). Of course, some philosophers have been doing just that for some time now 
(Knobe 2017). For instance, some experimental philosophers test hypotheses about the alleged 
intuitiveness of philosophical ideas and responses to thought experiments (see, e.g., Kissinger-
Knox et al. 2018). I welcome such empirical work in philosophy. 
 
Contrary to what Wills (2018, 19) seems to think, then, my aim is not to antagonize 
philosophers. Rather, my aim is to reform philosophy. In particular, as I have suggested in my 
recent reply to Brown (Mizrahi 2018a, 22), I think that philosophy would benefit from adopting 
not only the experimental methods of the cognitive and social sciences, as experimental 
philosophers have done, but also the methods of data science, such as data mining and corpus 
analysis (see, e.g., Ashton and Mizrahi 2018a and 2018b). Indeed, the XPhi Replicability Project 
recently published a report on replication studies of 40 experimental studies according to which 
experimental studies “successfully replicated about 70% of the time” (Cova et al. 2018). With 
such a success rate, one could argue that the empirical revolution in philosophy is well under 
way (see also Knobe 2015). Resistance is futile! 
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